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  Abstract:  In this essay on Masahiko Aoki’s recent study of Japanese 
corporate governance, we argue that he and others misdescribe Japan on several 
fundamental dimensions.  First, Japanese firms and employees choose neither to 
arrange implicit life-time employment contracts nor to invest heavily in firm-specific 
skills.  Instead, firms keep employees employed during economic downturns only 
because interventionist courts do not let them lay their employees off.  Second, 
Japanese firms do not organize themselves into keiretsu corporate groups, do not 
exchange shares with other alleged group members, and do not necessarily use the 
money-center bank attributed to the group as their “main bank.”  Last, Japanese 
“main banks” neither agree in advance to rescue troubled debtors nor monitor firms 
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  If our facts don’t fit the theory, we need new theory.   
  And why not?  Ostensibly at least, we write these articles to help us understand the world 
we live in.  Our theory serves a purpose if it helps us understand.  If it doesn’t fit the facts, how 
could it do that?  If it doesn’t fit the facts, we need new theory.   
  In fact, of course, we don’t.  At least not necessarily – for facts are not always what they 
seem.  As we all know, our facts are not raw empirical phenomena.  They are selected, sorted 
phenomena, and we cannot select and sort without theoretical priors.  Sometimes, when the theory 
doesn’t fit the facts, we need new facts.   
  No matter.  Among scholars combing Japan for facts on which to apply new theory, Shangri 
La now lies in a field one might have thought home to the most hard-nosed Chicago-school 
economic analysis:  corporate finance and governance.  Central to these new theories is the 
apparent empirical phenomenon of the “main bank."  And in developing the new theory to explain 
the “main bank system,” no one has played a bigger role than game-theorist Masahiko Aoki.  Even 
in law, few U.S. scholars (as we note below) write about Japanese corporate governance without at 
least addressing -- and usually following -- his work.   
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  To explore the issues raised by Japanese corporate governance, we first outline the standard 
set of “facts” by which most scholars understand the phenomena (Section I).  We then summarize 
the new theory Aoki advances to explain those facts (Section II), and the consequences for legal 
reform (Section III).  Finally, we show how these facts and theory fundamentally misdescribe 
Japan (Section IV). 
 
I.  The Old Facts 
  “No match made in heaven,” F.M.Scherer once observed, “is more blissful than an extant 
economic theory that finds an important real-world phenomenon to explain.”  Given the fit it seems 
to offer new theory, Japanese corporate governance promises more than its share of academic bliss.  
To describe that governance, scholars typically begin with three interconnected propositions.   
Typically, they claim that firms and banks, at least through the 1980s, shared the following 
arrangements: 
a.  In order to induce their most promising employees to acquire skills tailored to the firm, 
large Japanese companies offered lifetime employment contracts. 
b.  Through cross-shareholding networks, Japanese executives could ignore both the risks 
of hostile acquisitions and the pressure of the stock market.  If their firm fell into 
distress, they instead answered to their principal bank. 
c.  That bank (the firm's "main bank") (i) assembled its most important clients around it as 
a "keiretsu" group; (ii) monitored those client firms carefully; (iii) monitored those 
firms on behalf of other banks as well; and (iv) took control of (and often bailed out) 
such firms if they fell into trouble. 
  Curtis Milhaupt (2001: xx), for example, described Japanese corporate governance as a 
function of four key features:   
1) the main bank system and its role in corporate monitoring, 2) the absence of an external 
market for corporate control, 3) the structure and role of Japanese boards, and 4) the 
lifetime employment system. 
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller (1995: 81, 85) debated whether the monitoring and rescue 
arrangements offered by the Japanese main banks were efficient, but not whether they existed:  
within Japan, "bank oversight replaces the market for corporate control" and managers of main-
bank affiliated "firms sacrifice control and flexibility for the safety and security of a main bank 
relationship."  Mark Roe and Ronald Gilson (1999) discussed at length why Japanese firms offered 
employees long-term contracts, but never seriously whether they did so.  They (1993) similarly 
discussed why Japanese firms maintained keiretsu ties, but not whether they did.   
  The consensus extends broadly into economics.  In his standard textbook on the Japanese 
economy, Takatoshi Itoh (1992: 116) wrote that a "firm and its main bank have a long-term 
relationship ....  The firm receives help from the main bank with its finances and management ... 
regularly, but especially when the firm is in financial trouble."  No less prominent a pair of modern 
theorists than Paul Milgrom and John Roberts described the Japanese economy as involving 
"permanent employment guarantees," "Firms run for employees," "Cross-holdings of stock," 
"Main-bank relations," and "Keiretsu" (1994: 17-18).  According to Milgrom and Roberts, 
Japanese managers obtain their power through the cross-shareholdings, which "are perhaps most 
familiar in the case of member firms in keiretsu groups."  Within these groups, "most of the voting 
shares are effectively in the hands of managers" (id., 23 & n.10) who use their power to offer each 
other lifetime employment contracts.  These contracts, in turn, "support[] their developing and 
committing their human capital" (id., 22).  The keiretsu groups "help[] with maintaining permanent Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 4 
employment by member firms' supporting other members that [are] in financial difficulties and 
absorbing employees from members that need[] to reduce employment" (id., 32).  Throughout the 
process, ultimately, "the 'main bank' play[s] a central, long-term role both as a lead source of 
financing, as a monitor, and as an ultimate risk-bearer in circumstances of financial distress" (id., 
23-24). 
Among empiricists, Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein (1990, 1991) 
claimed that Japanese main banks reduce the cost of financial distress for keiretsu firms.  Iwao 
Nakatani (1984: 245) argued that main banks offered their debtors "implicit mutual insurance" 
against economic downturns.  And Paul Sheard (1989: 407) claimed that "the main bank provides 
an important substitute mechanism for what in effect is a 'missing' takeover market in Japan." 
  These propositions reach back in time.  Already in 1976, Henry C. Wallich and Mable I. 
Wallich (273) had written that "the main bank assumes a special responsibility with respect to the 
borrower.  In an emergency other creditors therefore can expect their claims to effectively though 
not legally outrank those of the main bank."  And they reach across disciplines.  According to 
sociologist Ronald Dore (2000: 34), “[m]ost big firms deal with a number of banks, but one of 
them is usually recognized as the ‘main bank.’”  That is the bank “which has to pick up the pieces 
when a firm gets into trouble and needs a restructuring rescue from the brink of bankruptcy.” 
 
II.  Aoki’s New Theory 
A.  Introduction: 
  For scholars working on the comparative dimensions of corporate governance, Aoki 
promises an integrative logic.  A chaired economics professor at Stanford, he is well-known not 
just in the U.S., though he is eminently that.  Publishing simultaneously in English and Japanese, 
and alternating time at Stanford with stints at the equally prestigious University of Kyoto, he has 
increasingly taken center stage in the Japanese academy as well.  By the mid-1990s he was 
president of the Japanese Economic Association, and now directs the influential economic research 
institute at the Ministry of Economy & Industry (formerly MITI).  
  Aoki built his reputation in Japanese corporate governance through a prolific stream of 
books and articles.  Like many game-theorists, he generally kept this work mathematical.  Usually, 
however, he based it on a set of empirical priors about Japan that most U.S. scholars take for 
granted.  In Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity, he collects and 
integrates much of this recent work.  He begins with his vision of the shop floor (Section B, 
below), and moves to the ties between the shop and its "main bank" (Section C).  From there, he 
turns to the connections between the bank and the government (Section D).   
 
B.  Labor: 
  Aoki starts his story at the factory.  How a firm organizes its workers, he tells us, affects the 
skills they acquire.  In Japan, managers structure their firms in ways that cause workers to invest 
heavily in “contextual skills.”  By contrast, U.S. workers invest more in “functional skills” (44-45).  
Largely, the dichotomy tracks Gary Becker’s classic distinction between “firm-specific” and 
"general" skills (see Aoki, 1990a: 18; 1990b: 28).  The former, Becker (1964) explained, were 
skills that did not transfer readily to other firms.  The latter were skills a worker could use as 
profitably elsewhere. 
  According to Aoki, this diversity between skill populations occurs at an inter-national rather 
than inter-industry level.  Although both the U.S. and Japan would do better if each had a mix of 
both types of workers, neither does.  Instead, "there is a tendency for a single organizational mode Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 5 
to prevail and become established as a convention within each economy” (46).  As a result, U.S. 
workers build only functional (general) skills; Japanese workers invest only in contextual (firm-
specific) skills.   
To explain this dynamic, Aoki provides an elaborate evolutionary game model (46-59), and 
argues that the intra-national uniformity follows from the "bounded rationality" of workers.   
Because of the computational limits we all face, workers choose their skills by mimicking their 
most successful peers.  Because of their "bounded rationality," they see "the prevailing strategy in 
society" as the one that is "generally advantageous for themselves" (10-11).  They copy like 
lemmings, because copying is the cheapest way to learn.
1 
According to Aoki, this distinction between contextual (firm-specific) and functional 
(general) skills captures several crucial differences between U.S. and Japanese firms.  First, it 
explains national patterns of comparative advantage.  Because the optimal skill mix varies by 
industry, Japanese firms will do best where “contextual” knowledge matters most.  U.S. firms will 
do well where “functional” skills matter more (39-41, 45, 120-25; see Aoki, 1990a: 3-10).   
Second, the distinction explains the longer worker tenure in Japan than in the U.S. (57, 137, 
171).  As Becker himself observed, workers and firms will invest heavily in firm-specific skills (by 
definition, skills that are useless elsewhere) only if they expect a worker to stay at the firm long-
term.  By contrast, workers will readily invest in general (i.e., transferable) skills even if they 
expect to leave soon.  In order to induce their employees to invest in contextual (firm-specific) 
skills, Japanese firms offer “lifetime employment.”
2   They then commit to keeping a worker 
employed when times are bad, by implicitly arranging for a main bank to rescue them when in 
distress (so long as the firm is still viable long-term; more on this below).  "[T]he rescue of 
financially distressed firms" by main banks, Aoki explains elsewhere (Aoki, Patrick & Sheard, 
1994: 18), "helps to preserve the firm-specific human assets accumulated in the framework of the 
life-time employment system and hence provides incentives for them to be generated in the first 
place." 
  Third, because they have exclusively contextual (firm-specific) skills, Japanese workers 
have strong incentives to shirk.  The claim will surprise readers used to stereotypes about 
hardworking Japanese employees.  But to Aoki, their skills are contextual because they involve 
team work.  Since “team work is the typical mode of operation," continues he, "no individual 
contributions to the organization can be clearly identified” (12; see 66).  Because workers produce 
only as part of a group, managers cannot tell whether each employee is working hard.  With their 
effort unobserved and essentially unobservable, Japanese workers have little incentive to try hard.  
  In Aoki's world, workers do work hard -- but because of the threat that the main bank will 
otherwise intervene.  Although managers cannot tell whether any given employee shirks, the main 
                     
1 The intra-national uniformity in Aoki's model actually follows less from bounded rationality than from his 
assumption that workers are homogeneous.  Once one posits identical workers, if they all mimic the most successful 
incumbents they will obviously all choose the same strategy.  The resulting uniformity simply repeats the initial 
assumption. 
One might have expected Aoki to rely on “network effects” and “path dependence” to explain the (alleged) 
homogeneity, much as some scholars explain the persistence of qwerty keyboards and VHS systems in the fact of 
(allegedly) superior alternatives (but see Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990, 1995).  In fact, Aoki does not do so. 
2 Aoki suggests that the preponderance of contextual skills in Japan dictates that employee pay be the subject 
of ex post bargaining (12, 156; see Aoki, 1990a: 20-21; 1990b: 28, 44-47).  Given that firms enter the labor market 
every year to recruit new employees, however, reputational concerns would seem to dictate that firms pay an employee 
the sum of the employee's market wage plus a market return on his firm-specific investment.   Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 6 
bank can tell whether the firm is in trouble.  By contracting to intervene when the firm hits those 
troubled times (and sometimes to shut it down), the bank gives employees the requisite incentives.  
“[T]he relative lack of freeriding in Japanese firms is attributable," he writes, "to the relatively 
effective operation of the institutional mechanism for controlling it” (12) -- namely, the main 
bank's "contingent governance system."  
This system works, Aoki continues, because with no lateral labor market and no 
transferable skills anyway, a discharged employee would incur huge penalties (13).  It matters, 
because “[t]he market for corporate control does not function in Japan” (64).  Shirking Japanese 
workers do not fear T.-Boone-Pickens look-alikes, for there are none.  They fear the bank. 
 
C.  Capital: 
  For Aoki as for most U.S. observers, the essence of Japanese corporate governance lies in 
the "main bank system."  Most big firms, he states, borrow from many banks but have a special 
relationship with one.  That one is its "main bank."  Crucially, the firm maintains a relationship 
with its “main bank” that differs from its relationship with others in two ways.   
First, the main bank acts as the firm's "delegated monitor":  it watches the firm on behalf of 
all other banks.
3  Because banks would waste resources if they redundantly monitored the same 
firm, the main bank serves as their "exclusive" (79) monitor.  The others implicitly (they make 
none of these deals explicitly, even orally) “delegate” that job to it.  They then abandon all further 
monitoring efforts.  This works, to Aoki, because the main bank groupings are coterminous with 
the “keiretsu” corporate groups (80, 97).  The secondary banks defer to the main bank, in other 
words, because the latter are "well equipped to assess the organizational and managerial ability of 
firms belonging to their own keiretsu groupings” (80). 
  Second, the main bank takes over the firm if it “encounter[s] financial difficulties” (71).  
Under its "contingent governance" framework, the main bank intervenes if a debtor fails to make 
payments as due.  It then decides whether the firm is economically viable long-term.  If it is, it 
saves it.  If not, it lets it die.
4  At the outset, in short, a firm's main bank "implicitly" promises 
(again, none of this is explicit) fairly to evaluate a debtor that falls into distress.  If the firm is 
savable, it promises to “take responsibility for paying the costs necessary for bailing out the firm,” 
to “guarantee the payment of debts to other banks,” and to “guarantee[] the employment of its core 
employees" (71).
5   
  Note the connection to Aoki’s vision of the shop floor.  If a firm is viable long-term, the 
main bank implicitly agrees to keep its employees employed.  Hence, workers can safely invest in 
                     
3 Absent the main bank system, Aoki implausibly suggests, banks might lend without monitoring at all (see 
15, 82-83). 
4 Note that the contractual terms that Aoki posits as lying behind this "contingent governance system" are not 
peculiar to the Japanese "main bank system."  Instead, they represent the standard bank loan contract among lenders 
everywhere.   
5 The argument that the main bank aids distressed but viable firms is one made more elaborately in Hoshi, 
Kashyap & Scharfstein (1990, 1991).  For a discussion of the problems (both theoretical and empirical) with this claim, 
see Hayashi (2000); Miwa & Ramseyer (2001). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 7 
contextual (firm-specific) skills.
6  If not, the bank will shut it down.  Hence, even workers whose 
effort is unobservable will work hard.   
 
D.  Government: 
  Employees invest in firm-specific skills because the firm implicitly promises them long-
term employment.  They believe the promise because the main bank stands behind it.  But why 
does anyone believe the bank?
7  They believe it, Aoki argues, because the main bank would lose 
valuable regulatory perquisites if it cheated on these implicit promises.  In the end, the main bank 
does what it implicitly promises because the government bribes it to do so (86-87).
8 
  During most of the post-war years, recounts Aoki, the government capped deposit interest 
rates at low levels (14-15).  Simultaneously, it excluded new entrants to the banking industry, and 
banks restricted the market for bonds.  In such a world, banks earned regulatory rents proportional 
to their share of the deposit market.  To increase their deposits they needed new branches, yet 
branches in turn required government approval.  Hence, the government could use its control over 
new branches to control bank behavior.   
With this power, claims Aoki, the government set the value of the rents accruing from new 
branches at the knife-edge level that induced efficient bank behavior.  Implicitly, it announced that 
a bank would jeopardize those rents if it shut a firm down.  It then set the rents large enough that a 
bank would not close down a long-term viable firm.  It set them small enough that a bank would 
not save a non-viable firm for the sake of the rents.  "[C]oncerned about the social consequences of 
bankruptcy," it used its powers to "penalize banks that liquidate[d] too frequently by dispatching 
managers to those banks or restricting their branch licensing” (87). 
 
III.  Reform 
  This vision of Japanese firms and governance has engendered predictable reformist 
consequences.  In the early 1990s, for example, Aoki and several others urged transitional 
economies to install a “main bank system” rather than the “Anglo-American” corporate governance 
model (e.g., Aoki & Patrick, 1994; Hoshi, Kashyap & Loveman, 1994).  Avoid turning 
instinctively to decentralized market finance, they suggested.  Rather, try substituting for the 
paternalistic face of the socialist state the monitoring face of the main bank.   
  Some of what seemed plausible in 1990 seems less so in 2001, and within Japan many 
scholars (not including Aoki) now suggest using the law to dismantle the “main bank system.”  
Adopt instead, they argue, the classic governance arrangements involving director and shareholder 
                     
6 Aoki seems to think this arrangement efficient, but the logic is unclear.  If the value of an employee’s firm-
specific skills are such that it is inefficient to lay him off (Aoki’s own benchmark; see 83), shareholders would not have 
an incentive to do so.  If profit-maximizing shareholders would choose to lay off employees with firm-specific skills, 
inducing a bank to keep them employed necessarily lowers social welfare. 
7 Why promissory credibility (if a bank ever did make such a promise) would be problematic in this context is 
ambiguous.  According to Aoki, the problem lies in the fact that the main bank shares the benefits from rescuing a firm 
but, because it “has to guarantee other creditors’ claims,” bears the full cost (83).  Given that (according to this story) 
each of the money-center banks takes turns acting as a main bank, any bank’s losses at one firm would be offset by its 
expected gains elsewhere.  In theory, the threat of ostracism from this group should prevent defection from the 
equilibrium without any threat of losing regulatory rents. 
8 Aoki (79-80) argues that the monitoring expertise was first developed by the government-affiliated banks 
during World War II.  For evidence that this was not the case, see Miwa & Ramseyer (2000a). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 8 
oversight.
9   Although a shift away from Aoki’s vision may be occurring within the Japanese 
academy, in other words, it remains a normative rather than empirical shift.  Scholars debate 
whether the “main bank system” improves on “classic” governance.  They steadfastly refuse to 
question whether Japan actually had a “main bank system.”  
  Some of the recent proposals are harmless enough, if also largely meritless.  For instance, 
many scholars (including Aoki, at 133-40) urged the government to abolish the post-war ban on 
holding companies.  Doing so would, they argued, expand managerial flexibility.  Fair enough, 
except that under existing law a firm qualified as a holding company only if it had but trivial 
business operations.  As firms could avoid the ban by doing something besides holding stock, 
abolishing it was not likely to accomplish much. 
  Other scholars urged that firms be able to offer executives stock options.  Through such 
options, they explained, firms could introduce performance-based compensation schemes.  Fair 
enough again, except that nothing in the existing law stopped them from offering performance-
based pay.  Although firms could not have offered U.S.-style option plans, nothing kept them from 
pegging salaries to stock prices.  As firms could pay market-based compensation without options, 
permitting them was not likely accomplish more than permitting holding companies. 
  The more disastrous proposals involve mandatory terms.  For example, many observers 
demand that Japanese firms hire outside directors -- on the theory that outsiders will more 
aggressively police shareholder welfare.  Unfortunately, they demand the directors without asking 
why firms in competitive markets can succeed without them.  As Demsetz & Lehn (1985) pointed 
out, firms will adopt the governance arrangements that best let them compete.  What arrangement 
does so will vary from firm to firm, but not the principle that firms choose the best arrangement or 
die.  Firms that ignore their firm-specific optimum will find themselves at a disadvantage in the 
capital, service, and product markets.  Eventually, they will drive themselves out of business.   
  Reformers would also require fuller financial disclosure -- on the theory that investors 
cannot police managers without it.  Unfortunately again, they demand the information without 
asking how existing firms can raise funds without it.  As Stigler (1964) explained, firms will 
choose the level of disclosure that maximizes investor returns.  Investors value information, but not 
unlimitedly.  They must pay for it, and information is costly.  As a result, if a firm discloses either 
too much information or too little, it will find itself at a capital market disadvantage.  Eventually, it 
too will run itself out of business.   
  And reformers would encourage derivative suits -- on the theory that shareholders can use 
them to police their designated agents.  Alas, as implemented in the U.S. derivative suits have been 
nothing short of disastrous:  consistently, they have redistributed wealth to the plaintiffs’ bar and 
done nothing to enhance firm performance (Romano, 1991).  In Japan, reformers have adopted 
derivative litigation rules that track U.S. lines.  Predictably, the results have begun to emulate those 
in the U.S. as well (West, 2001). 
 
IV.  The Fit 
  Such is the new theory Aoki gives us, along with the reformist consequences to the 
stereotypic vision of the Japanese economy.  But did we need new theory?  Or did we need better 
facts?  Consider the key components of the standard “facts”:  the lifetime employment offers 
(Section A), the keiretsu corporate groups (Section B), and the main bank contracts (Section C).   
                     
9 “Classic,” as described in standard hornbooks.  Like their U.S. counterparts, many Japanese legal scholars 
seem implicitly to assume that the classic arrangements function in the U.S. as described in these texts.  They do not, of 
course, but that is beyond the scope of this review essay. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 9 
 
A.  Lifetime Employment: 
1.  Implicit contracts. -- We have long known that smaller Japanese firms lay off employees 
readily.  We have known too that even the larger firms retire their employees at an early age.  But 
do the big firms implicitly promise to pay their employees until that retirement age?  Lawyers 
should recognize the problem:  if firms wanted to promise a job long-term, why did they not do so?  
An “implicit promise” is a promise a firm never made, after all, for had it made it the promise 
would be “explicit.”  If a firm wanted to induce its employees to rely on a long-term job and invest 
in non-transferable skills, why did it not offer them a long-term contract?   
If firms and employees did find long-term contracts advantageous, drafting them would be 
simple.  If employees worried that the firm might breach the contract, it could include a liquidated 
damages clause.  If they worried about its ability to pay in a downturn, it could buy an ERISA-style 
guaranty from an insurance company.  And if firms offered the deals routinely, economies of scale 
would reduce the transactions costs to trivial levels.   
Notwithstanding, Japanese firms never offered long-term contracts explicitly.  Perhaps, 
however, the right interpretation is not that they promised them implicitly.  Perhaps the right 
interpretation is that they never promised them. 
 
  2.  The role of the courts. -- Maybe a little history and law would help.  During the decades 
before the war, labor relations in Japan were relentlessly fluid (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2000b).   
Employees quit, and firms laid off.  Only in the late 1950s did observers start to talk about long-
term employment (Abegglen, 1958).  During the 1950s, the Japanese economy had grown 
relatively steadily, and after 1960 it grew spectacularly fast.  From 1953 to 1959 growth hovered at 
5 to 9 percent.  It jumped to 13 percent in 1960, and stayed in that double-digit range for most of 
the 1960s.   
  In the mid-1970s, the Arab oil embargo hit.  Growth fell abruptly, and soon large Japanese 
firms began to lay off their employees.  When they did, sometimes the employees sued.  Those 
employees that did, often won.  Unless the firm could show that it would otherwise fail (something 
small firms could more readily show than the larger diversified firms), the courts refused to let the 
lay offs proceed (Milhaupt, Ramseyer & Young, 2001: 384-98; collecting cases).  The courts did 
not claim that the employees had bargained for a no-lay-off clause in their contracts.  Nor could 
they, for by their terms most of the contracts were straightforward at-will arrangements.  Instead, 
the courts argued from status:  if an employer laid off employees in order to keep profits up, 
contract or no contract it abused its power as an employer. 
  In stopping the bigger firms from discharging their employees, the courts engendered 
predictable consequences.  First, because big firms cannot lay off when times are bad, they do not 
hire when times are good.  The famously long work hours during peak demand follow.  Second, 
because they cannot lay off, they contract for much of their production with suppliers that can.  In 
industries like automobile production the major assemblers could seldom show a court that they 
would fail unless they laid off.  Accordingly, rather than expand internally like Ford and GM, they 
buy from smaller, undiversified suppliers who can justify lay offs during slack demand (see Miwa 
& Ramseyer, 2000c). 
  The point is this:  large Japanese firms do not keep their employees on the payroll because 
they want to keep them, much less because they promise to keep them.  They keep them because 
courts do not let them fire them.  At the large diversified companies, long-term employment is not 
an implicit contract -- firms and employees could have negotiated no-lay-off clauses, but adopted Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 10 
at-will clauses instead.  It is a choice the courts impose on parties who could have selected the deal 
but did not. 
 
  3.  Specific investments. -- If Japanese firms do not promise long-term employment, neither 
do Japanese workers invest exclusively or even overwhelmingly in firm-specific skills.  Aoki to the 
contrary notwithstanding, U.S. industries obviously vary broadly in the extent to which workers 
build transferable and non-transferable skills.  Architectural firms hire architects for specific jobs, 
and fire them when through.  Traditionally if perhaps no longer, law firms hired their experienced 
lawyers for life.  This variation in tenure reflected variations in skill:  architects knew how to 
design buildings for anyone, but good lawyers knew the detail of their own clients' businesses.   
  The same applies to Japan.  To be sure, mean tenure is longer than in the U.S.  Male U.S. 
employees have an average of 7.5 years at a firm (6.8 years, female), where male Japanese 
employees have 12.9 (7.9, female).  Male U.S. employees are closer to their counterparts in other 
corners of the former British empire:  8.9 years at the U.K., 8.8 in Canada, and 7.1 in Australia.  
Japanese men are closer to the Europeans:  10.6 years in Germany, 11.0 years in France, 12.1 years 
in Italy, 11.0 years in Austria, and 10.4 years in Switzerland (OECD, 1997: 139; 1995 data).  
  Nonetheless, in both countries the mean hides the inter-industry variation.  Average tenure 
in the U.S. ranges from 4.1 years in the hotel and restaurant industry and 5.7 years in real estate, to 
9.0 years in manufacturing and 13.5 years in electricity, gas and water.  In Japan, average tenure 
ranges from 8.1 years in real estate, to 10.6 years in trade (including hotel and restaurants), 13.1 
years in manufacturing, and 17.3 years in electricity, gas and water (id.). 
 
B.  Keiretsu: 
  According to Aoki, a firm's main bank tends to be its best monitor because both belong to 
the same keiretsu corporate group.  Apparently, like most observers he assumes keiretsu firms use 
the keiretsu money-center bank as their main bank.
10  As often as not, they do not. 
At root, the keiretsu were a convenient fiction from the start (see generally Miwa & 
Ramseyer, 2001).  They are not conglomerates.  Neither are they webs of cross-shareholdings 
(Bergloef & Peroth, 1994), Williamsonian hostage exchanges (Gilson & Roe, 1993), defenses 
against hostile acquisitions (Morck & Nakamura, 1999), or interconnected networks of relational 
contracts (Lincoln, Gerlach & Ahmadjian, 1996). 
Instead, the keiretsu are the 1960s creation of Marxist academics and populist journalists.  
Marxists had emerged from the war in good form, and for several decades ran the university 
economics departments.  They also famously ran the leading newspapers.  According to their 
theory, "monopoly capital" would dominate the "contradictions" of their "bourgeois capitalist" 
world.  In the ruthlessly competitive world of 1960s Japan, however, monopolists were nowhere to 
be found.  Posit shadowy groups of corporations encircling giant money-center banks, and the 
dominating capital could begin to take shape.  Create lists of the corporations sorted by the source 
of their loans, and even its identity would become clear (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2001).   
This is not a jest.  The creators of the most commonly used (but apparently never read) 
keiretsu roster (the Keiretsu no kenkyu; see Keizai) did nothing more than sort TSE-listed firms by 
the source of their debt.  When they created their famous lists of keiretsu groups, they did not turn 
                     
10 An extremely common assumption -- e.g., Fukuda and Hirota (1996); Hall & Weinstein (2000); Hanazaki 
and Horiuchi (2000); Horiuchi, Packer and Fukuda (1988); Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990); Morck and 
Nakamura (1999); Nakatani (1984); Prowse (1990); Sheard (1989: 401); Weinstein and Yafeh (1998).  Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 11 
to cross-shareholdings, personnel exchanges, or relational trading ties.  Instead, they simply asked 
where a firm borrowed the most money (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2001).   
 Keiretsu "cross-shareholdings" are not now unwinding, for there were no arrangements to 
unwind.  In 1965 at the putative zenith of the keiretsu, the Sumitomo group had 48 non-financial 
firms.
11  Of the over 1000 possible pairings among these firms, only 11 had at least a 1 percent 
stake in each other.  Among the 48 non-financial firms of the Mitsui group and the 36 of the 
Sanwa, only 6 pairs exchanged 1 percent stakes.  Among the 46 Mitsubishi non-financial firms 4 
pairs did, among the 45 Fuji firms 3 pairs, and among the 29 Daiichi firms 2 pairs (id.).  The 
occasional references in the American literature to much higher levels simply refer to all shares 
held by corporate investors.   
  Neither were there relational trades to undo.  In the early 1990s, the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission (Kosei, 1994: 139) surveyed trading ties among the manufacturing firms in the 
keiretsu groups (they used the list of firms whose presidents ate lunch with each other 
occasionally).  All told, the firms sold 12.58 percent of their output to other keiretsu members -- 
2.38 percent if one excluded the amounts they sold to their trading company, which then mostly 
resold the goods outside the group.  The fraction ranged from 5.57 percent at the Sanwa group 
(excluding the trading company, 1.49 percent) to 31.67 percent at the Sumitomo (excluding the 
trading company, 0.61 percent).  The firms bought an average of 6.71 percent of their inputs from 
other keiretsu members -- 2.24 percent if one excluded material bought from the group trading 
company.  The fraction ranged from 3.67 percent at the Fuji group (excluding the trading company, 
1.23 percent) to 15.87 percent at the Mitsubishi (excluding the trading company, 5.40). 
  Even given all this, so long as the keiretsu rosters were based on firm debt sources, one 
might have thought the keiretsu bank would act as the main bank to group firms.  After all, a firm's 
main bank was (by the standard definition) its largest source of debt.  If the compilers assembled 
the keiretsu rosters by looking at debt, then the proposition that keiretsu firms used the keiretsu 
money-center bank as their main bank ought to be as true as it is circular.  Ought to be, but is not -- 
for reasons that trace their roots again to 1960s-vintage Marxist theory.   
In their eagerness to identify conspiratorial empires of "monopoly capital," the creators of 
the standard keiretsu rosters made two fatal (for main-bank theorists) choices.  First, they pooled 
the loans from all financial institutions that had been owned by the same family before the war (see 
Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002).  To identify the Mitsubishi keiretsu, for example, they summed all 
funds loaned by the now-independently owned and operated Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust 
Bank, Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance Company, and Meiji Life Insurance Company.  Second, 
they ignored loans from the large banks with government ties.  They thus excluded all loans from 
banks like the Japan Development Bank.   
Now suppose either (a) that the sum of the pooled financial-institution loans exceeds the 
loans from the bank that loans the most, and that the latter bank is outside the keiretsu, or (b) that 
the firm borrows the largest amount from a bank like the JDB.  Keiretsu affiliation will no longer 
track main bank status.  Add to those possibilities the fact that many firms use one of the trust 
banks as their main bank, and the assumption that keiretsu members use the keiretsu money-center 
bank as their main bank becomes true only half the time. 
To illustrate this problem, take the Tobu Railroad.  As of 1975, it borrowed 192 billion yen 
from financial institutions.  Of this amount, it borrowed the most from (in million yen): 
  Mitsui Trust Bank:  24,059 
                     
11 By the Keiretsu no kenkyu roster, definition (2).  See Miwa & Ramseyer (2001). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 12 
 Mitsubishi  Trust  Bank:  21,844 
  Yasuda Trust Bank:  20,975 
  Japan Development Bank:  16,789 
 Fuji  Bank:  15,404 
The standard keiretsu roster placed Tobu in the Fuji group because the sum of its debt from the 
Yasuda Trust Bank and Fuji Bank exceeded its total Mitsui or Mitsubishi loans, and the 
predecessors to the Yasuda Trust Bank and the Fuji Bank had been in the same zaibatsu before the 
war.  Although main bank theorists routinely assume that a keiretsu firm will use the  keiretsu 
money-center bank as its main bank, for Tobu the Fuji Bank was but its fifth-largest lender (Miwa 
& Ramseyer, 2001).   
This problem pervades the keiretsu rosters.  Although the keiretsu rosters were based 
exclusively on the source of a firm’s debt, in 1975 only 40 percent of the firms in the Mitsui 
keiretsu used the Mitsui Bank as their main bank.  At the Mitsubishi group, only 42 percent used 
the Mitsubishi Bank as their main bank, at the Sumitomo group 48 percent used the Sumitomo 
Bank, at the Fuji group 56 percent used the Fuji Bank, and at the Sanwa group 62 percent used the 
Sanwa Bank.  Of the six major keiretsu, only at the Daiichi-Kangyo group was the figure above 80 
percent (see Miwa & Ramseyer, 2001).   
 
C.  Main Banks: 
  1.  Firm rescues. -- Do main banks implicitly promise to rescue troubled but viable firms?  
Implicitly promise?  Given that an "implicit promise" is a promise they never made (else it would 
be explicit), the proposition raises the same problem as the putative lifetime employment contract, 
only more so:  if banks and firms wanted to make such an agreement, why not make it?  These 
parties regularly fell forests, after all, to document their security interests, their trust indentures, and 
-- yes -- their insurance contracts.  Would internationally prominent money-center banks and 
Tokyo-Stock-Exchange-listed firms enter what are effectively billion-dollar insurance contracts 
without written contracts, without even oral agreements, and rely instead on unstated 
assumptions?
12 
  If a bank did offer such an insurance arrangement (whether explicitly or implicitly), could it 
make money on the deal?
13  One might have thought a bank that offered to save distressed debtors 
would disproportionately attract the highest risk firms (a phenomenon called adverse selection).  
One might have thought it would induce its low-risk debtors to switch to higher risk projects (moral 
hazard).  Precisely for those reasons, most banks in the real world try to cultivate a reputation 
instead for punishing defaulting debtors.  Main bank theorists would have them building the 
opposite reputation entirely.   
  Aoki suggests banks saved failing debtors because they wanted the regulatory rents that 
branch offices yielded, and the government only gave them new branches if they rescued troubled 
clients.  One should wonder.  In the 1960s banks typically operated a new branch nearly two years 
before it began to turn a profit, and another two years before they recouped their heavy early losses 
(Okura sho, 1970: 56-57).  The money-center banks (and Aoki’s and most western main-bank 
                     
12 Paul Sheard (1994b: 17) characterizes the question of why Japanese banks do not write out the "main bank 
contract" as "somewhat of a puzzle."  The answer is that there never was any contract to write out. 
13 From time to time, scholars have argued that “keiretsu firms” paid higher interest rates on their loans, and 
that this reflected an implicit insurance premium (most prominently, Nakatani, 1984).  This is factually incorrect:  
keiretsu firms did not pay interest at higher rates.  See Miwa & Ramseyer (2001). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 13 
theories are theories about the money-center banks) opened few new offices anyway.  During the 
1960s, the Ministry of Finance instead favored the smaller, regional banks.  As a result, the big 
banks only opened about one new branch a year during the decade (Okura sho, 1969: 154, 1971: 
143), and their share of deposits fell from 32.5 percent in 1960 to 25 percent by 1969 (Kitahara, 
1970: 33; deposit shares at the 13 largest banks known as "city banks").  
Lest there be any doubt, we stress the point:  no one -- Aoki included -- has proffered any 
evidence that “main banks” offered their borrowers insurance arrangements against financial 
distress.  When main bank theorists argue that Japanese banks did, they point only to ex post 
rescues (e.g., Sheard, 1994a).  Sometimes, they show, some Japanese banks rescued some 
defaulting debtors.  Unfortunately for the theory, banks everywhere sometimes have incentives to 
rescue troubled debtors, particularly big debtors.  The aphorism that “if you owe the bank $100,000 
the bank owns you; if you owe the bank $100 million you own the bank” is as true in Japan as in 
the U.S.  Once a bank faces the prospect of a large loss on an outstanding debt, it often has an 
incentive to lend a bit more (or to cut the interest rate, or to write off a bit of the debt) to nurse the 
firm back to health.   
  Despite all the theory devoted to the subject, as often as not main banks do not stay around 
to help troubled firms.  To illustrate the point, Miwa (1996: 115-18) takes all exchange-listed non-
financial firms (120 in number) with three or more consecutive loss years ending in 1984, and asks 
whether the main bank continued to maintain the largest loan share during the decade.  If the theory 
described the facts, main banks should stay more closely attached to troubled firms than to the 
healthy.  In fact, they are less.  Among TSE Section 1 (the largest firms are listed on Section 1) 
firms generally, 66.8 percent of the firms maintained their main bank relationship unchanged.   
Among the 52 TSE-Section 1 firms with 3 or more consecutive loss years, only 60.3 percent did.  
Among the 62 total (i.e., TSE and other) firms with 3 years of losses, 54.9 percent did.  Among the 
24 firms with 4 loss years the figure was 70.8 percent, but for the 34 firms with 5 or more loss 
years it was 50.0.   
The large money-center banks were particularly likely to abandon their troubled clients 
(id.).  Among all TSE Section 1 firms, 41.2 percent maintained a stable relationship with a money-
center bank as their main bank throughout 1973-84.  Among the 52 TSE Section 1 firms with 3 or 
more consecutive loss years, only 25.9 percent did.  Among all firms (TSE and other) with 3 
consecutive loss years, 25.8 percent did.  Among those with 4 loss years the figure was 25.0 
percent, and with 5 or more loss years 23.5.   
Thanks to the main bank literature, one foreign economist who visited one of us in the early 
1990s roundly praised the Japanese system:  “it’s so great -- no firms ever fail in Japan!”  In fact, 
Japanese firms fail routinely, and always have.  From 1976 to 1980, 15,000 to 19,000 Japanese 
firms (3,000-4,000 manufacturing firms) failed annually (Nihon, 1984: 162).  During the same 
period (according to Bank of Japan data; id.), 6,000 to 12,000 U.S. firms failed each year (1,000-
2,000 manufacturers), 8,000-14,000 German firms (1,000-3,000 manufacturers), and 13,000 to 
18,000 French firms (2,000-4,000 manufacturers).  
 
  2.  Delegated monitoring. -- Do banks implicitly delegate to the main bank the job of 
monitoring common debtors?  Implicitly?  Would internationally prominent banks with multi-
million dollar loans at stake rely on their competitors to monitor a debtor without even discussing 
the issue?  If they never discussed it, the logical conclusion is not that they arranged the deal 
implicitly.  It is that they never arranged it at all. Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 14 
  Make no mistake.  Main bank theorists are not claiming that the main bank monitors more 
extensively than other banks.  They argue that only the main bank monitors.  By definition, the 
main bank is the bank with the most money at stake.  Given that the cost-effective level of 
monitoring will generally depend on the amount of money lent, a main bank will obviously monitor 
more extensively than the others.  The question is whether it monitors on behalf of the others. 
  Not only is there no evidence of this arrangement, the available data are again to the 
contrary.  As noted earlier, among the 100-odd financially troubled TSE firms in the 1980s, the 
main bank reduced its share of total loans about as often as it raised it (Miwa, 1996: 117-18).  
When a debtor encountered difficulty, as often as not it tried to lower its exposure.  Rather than tell 
its competitors about the problem, as often as not it tried to escape first. 
Aoki notes the waste to having multiple creditors monitor.  If the waste were substantial, 
however, it would raise the debtor's cost of credit.  Faced with higher costs, the debtor could adopt 
a more obvious tactic:  borrow from fewer banks.  In the 1960s, large Japanese firms generally 
borrowed only 15-20 percent from their lead bank.  The rest they spread among many competitors.  
Given the massive size of banks like the Daiichi Kangyo Bank and the Mitsubishi Bank, the banks’ 
own capital constraints would not have stopped them from lending customers more.  In 1965, for 
example, the Mitsubishi Bank lent 31 billion yen to the client that borrowed the most, Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries.  To its next largest client, Tokyo Electric, it lent 16 billion, and to its third largest 
11 billion.  If it could lend Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 31 billion, its own size did not prevent it 
from lending its much smaller clients more than 15-20 percent of their loan needs (Miwa & 
Ramseyer, 2001).  
By borrowing more money from fewer banks, Japanese firms would have reduced 
monitoring costs straightforwardly.  In many economically advanced countries, firms do borrow 
from fewer banks.  According to one study primarily of Western Europe, the average number of 
banks from which firms borrowed ranged from 15.2 in Italy to 2.3 in Norway.  In Germany, the 
average was 8.1, but in U.K. 2.9 (Ongena, 2000: 30).  Why the number varies so broadly from 
country to country remains a puzzle, but the wide workable range does suggest that the redundancy 
probably does not much raise costs. 
 
  3.  Shirking. -- Aoki's claims about shirking employees address (though ironically do not 
solve) a purely theoretical puzzle.  Whether in the U.S. or Japan, many production processes 
involve no indivisible work.  A worker on an automobile assembly line either performs his 
assigned task correctly or does not.  If not, either the line shuts down or the quality control manager 
takes him to task later.  An engineer either solves an assigned problem or does not.  If not, his 
supervisor gives it to someone else.  Even when a supervisor cannot observe effort, co-workers 
usually can (Aoki does not posit co-workers as monitors).  Competing for limited promotions, if 
any worker does shirk their co-workers usually have an incentive to let their supervisor know.
14 
  If worker effort were indeed unobservable, a main bank would add no discipline anyway.  
First, if the firm lacked long-term prospects, in shutting it down the main bank would simply do 
what the product market would have done without it.  The bank only appears in the picture, after 
all, when market pressure causes the firm to default in the first place.  Second, bank intervention 
                     
14 There may be terminological confusion here.  The manufacturing process everywhere (including Japan) 
often involves "team production" in the colloquial sense, but that does not mean supervisors cannot usually tell who is 
working hard and who is not.  The use of "team production" to refer to processes involving unobservable effort levels is 
instead peculiar to the theoretical literature -- e.g., Alchian & Demsetz (1972); Holmstrom (1982). Miwa & Ramseyer:  Page 15 
does nothing to obviate the prisoners' dilemma Aoki posits.  In Aoki's world, workers collectively 
share the gains from solvency, individually enjoy the returns from their shirking, and cannot 
credibly commit to high effort.  In such a game, the only equilibrium is for everyone to shirk, bank 
or no bank. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
We in the academy have a penchant for moderation.  We assume the truth is in the middle, 
and maybe it sometimes is.  Faced with apparently implausible claims about Japan, our instincts 
tell us that maybe the claims are overstated, that maybe more moderate versions would better 
approximate the truth.  If moderate versions still let us indulge our tastes for new theory, so much 
the better.  Maybe moderation usually works.  Here, it leads us badly astray. 
The claims about the Japanese main bank system are not overstated.  They are false.  They 
are not claims for which we have only ambiguous evidence.  They are claims for which we have 
none.  Firms and workers did not bargain for lifetime employment.  Banks neither promised to 
rescue defaulting debtors nor monitored debtors on behalf of their rivals.  The keiretsu had no 
substance, and the government had little clout. 
The truth about Japan is more logical, more mundane, more boring.  Firms tried to maintain 
the option of discharging workers when times were bad.  Banks tried to commit to punishing 
debtors who default.  They tried to recover their money from distressed firms before their 
competitors noticed the trouble.  The government did not pressure banks to promise in advance to 
save their deadbeat customers.  And although firms did borrow heavily, banks were not “the only 
game in town” (Hoshi & Kashyap 2001: 310).  Instead, firms raised funds through stocks, bonds, 
and trade credit -- and when they did borrow from financial institutions they had over 100 banks to 
which to turn.   
  Bad diagnosis begets bad prescription, and the current efforts toward legal reform in Japan 
reflect this ascendancy of bad theory over good facts.  Japanese firms may not have governed 
themselves the way law professors would have them governed, but they did not use a main-bank 
monitoring scheme either.  Whether in the U.S. or in Japan, firms raise funds in competitive capital 
markets, and buy and sell in competitive labor, service, and product markets.  Whether here or 
there, in order to survive they will need good governance schemes.  Toward that end, they will 
work out their governance on the fly.  What scheme they pick will depend on the products they sell, 
on the services they buy, on the customers they face, on the technology they use, and on the many 
and various personalities involved.  The scheme they pick will vary from firm to firm.  The fact 
that they will pick the optimal scheme or die will not.   
Aoki gave us a new theory for old facts.  Unfortunately, we needed better facts for the old 
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